for the technical issues of dynamic models of policy as a function of opinion-and particularly those involved in separating linkage through elections from linkage by our direct rational anticipation scenario-prevent more than a cursory look.
Notes
*This is a highly abbreviated account of our work in progress, "Dynamic Representation," some modeling aspects of which are reported in Stimson, MacKuen, Erikson, and Kellstedt 1993. This work was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant, SES-9011807, "Political Eras and Representation." We would like to thank Chris Wlezien, Robert Durr, Tami Buhr, and Paul Kellstedt for notable contributions to the measurement development activities we report here. We are grateful to Jeff Segal for sharing his Solicitor General data with us.
1. This focus on anticipation as the quintessential behavior of elected politicians has much commonality with Arnold's (1990) statement about the congressional part of government.
2. The case may be put negatively as well. Conservatives who once adopted moderation for self-protection would no longer feel the need to do so.
3. The estimates are central tendencies of all available survey marginals for policy preference questions asked in identical format over time. The estimation technology (see Stimson 1991) has a logic akin to that of principal components analysis, and thus the estimates may be thought of as something like factor scores. Those points require much evidence to be completely persuasive, but they are all illustrated by a simple comparison of income quantiles by race over time (see Table 1 ).
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Second, the "American dream"
richer at a faster rate than well-off white Americans (though from a lower absolute starting point); and middle-class African Americans are gaining ground at the same time that poor African Americans are losing it. Those points require much evidence to be completely persuasive, but they are all illustrated by a simple comparison of income quantiles by race over time (see Table 1 ).
Second, the "American dream" The same pattern holds for the second tenet. Three decades ago, middle-class blacks were more optimistic than poor blacks. They became less so over time since their belief in the American dream declined so sharply. In 1971, 17% more high-than low-income African Americans claimed to be "satisfied . . . with the future facing you and your family." But 15 years later, 36% more poor than well-off blacks felt that "looking to the future, . . . the American Dream will be easier to attain than today.'2
The pattern holds less sharply for the third tenet. Well-off blacks are always less likely than are poor blacks to hold members of their race responsible for their own situation (i.e., well-off blacks are less likely to accept the claim of the ideology), but they were more critical of their fellow blacks in the 1960s than in the 1980s (i.e., they came closer to accepting the claim of the ideology).
We have too few survey questions on the fourth tenet, about the worthiness of the pursuit, to be confident of any trends over time.
The Professor Hamilton even argues that the 1992 presidential election signaled the demise of the racially structured presidential campaigns of the last 30 years. Organizing politics around race is no longer, he claims, in the interests of the Republican Party (chastened by Willie Horton and David Duke), the Democratic Party (able to win without it), or black elites (sufficiently secure to move beyond racially based politics to their other perennial concern for social welfare issues). Political actors may, in short, judge that middle-class African Americans' overall continued endorsement of the American dream and their confidence in their own ability to succeed according to its precepts is the real story, and their growing skepticism is either temporary or narrowly focused on bounded concerns.
Political actors may, however, interpret public opinion differently. They may agree with Lani Guinier, Louis Farrakhan, and Ben Chavis that race still determines what happens even to well-off African Americans more than do class or individual characteristics, and that time is running out on blacks' patience with discrimination and stigmatization. A shared focus on race does not lead to shared policy goals or political strategies, as a quick canvass of the views of these three actors shows. But these actors are united in their claim that middleclass blacks are still more black than middle class, and in their insistence that racially targeted policies are essential if blacks are ever to get, and to believe that they are getting, fair rewards for their efforts. Put more schematically, political actors may judge that absent drastic action, middle-class African Americans' growing skepticism about the American dream will . .political actors may judge that absent drastic action, middle-class African Americans' growing skepticism about the American dream will eventually overwhelm their historical faith in democracy and opportunity, if it has not already done so. eventually overwhelm their historical faith in democracy and opportunity, if it has not already done so.
Of course, neither political actors nor analysts operate in a vacuum. The choices of the former are constrained by all of the things implied by the phrases "socioeconomic context" and "political structure"-ranging from multinational corporations' choices about where to locate factories to the arithmetic of single-member legislative districts. The judgments of the latter are constrained by the quality and range of the data they rely on and by the assumptions and commitments they bring to the interpretation of those data. Nevertheless, the great complexity and fluidity of Sensitive political actors understand this danger. Senator Bradley's challenge to then-President Bush and Professor Guinier's insistence that her goal is racial integration and understanding stand out as evidence that politicians are able to recognize that these issues are too serious for the politics of electoral safety or personal vengeance. Public policies may even be able to tip the balance of middle-class African Americans' allegiances toward the American dream if political actors can figure out how to respond simultaneously to racial and classbased anxieties.
Thus in this case the interactions among opinion, interpretation, and political action are not only more complicated than we usually realize-that may be true of any interaction worth attending to-but also more fraught. Most media and public attention, for good reason, is devoted to the small fraction of poor young men in large cities who have lost faith in any personal morality or social constraints. But at least some attention should be devoted to the more subtle but potentially just as serious loss of faith among those who seem to exemplify the American dream. It is one thing for jobless, illiterate, destitute young men to lash out at the society that apparently finds them expendable; it is quite another for professional, well-educated, wellpaid men and women to become embittered at the society that apparently searches for them eagerly. 
